How do I get the Quipu source code?

Email contacto@xiliux.com. The complete source of a released version is delivered with a hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-87 signature, the public key, a static verifier, the specification, the threat model and the internal pre-audit. No NDA, no cost, no expiry.

Why is Quipu no longer on GitHub, crates.io, PyPI or npm?

A deliberate decision taken in August 2026 after the year's chained supply-chain attacks on the public registries. The licence (AGPL-3.0) and the availability of the code did not change; the delivery channel did.

How to request the Quipu source code

Quipu is free software under AGPL-3.0 and the complete source is delivered to anyone who asks. What changed in August 2026 is not the licence and not the availability: it is the channel.

Ask by email

Write to contacto@xiliux.com. Telling us what you want it for — to evaluate it, audit it, integrate it, study it — helps us send what is useful to you, but it is not a requirement and not a condition. There is no form, no sign-up and no waiting list.

What you get

The code

Complete source of a released version, anchored to its exact commit. Nothing held back, nothing obfuscated, no separate "commercial edition".

The signature

A hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-87 signature, the public key, and a static verifier that needs no network and no dependencies.

The documents

Technical specification, threat model, written internal pre-audit and the reproducible-build notes.

No NDA, no restriction on publishing what you find, no expiry and no cost. If you audit Quipu and find a flaw, it is yours to publish.

Why it is no longer on the public registries

Since August 2026 the Quipu source is not hosted on GitHub and is not distributed through crates.io, PyPI or npm. This is not abandonment, not an incident, and there was no breach: it is a decision, and it is worth stating what it rests on.

Through 2026 the package registries and code-hosting platforms were hit by sustained, chained supply-chain attacks — the Shai-Hulud worm, ChainDrop on 4 August, and a VS Code extension that exfiltrated several thousand private repositories. These are not isolated incidents and there is no reason to believe they stop.

The reasoning is not "it could happen to us". It is narrower than that: we work in security, and a cryptography vendor having its code extracted from the platform it chose to host it on would not be an operational incident — it would be an argument against the product. A public registry also inserts a mandatory trusted third party between us and you: whoever compromises that registry, or the account, can hand you a tampered package carrying our name.

What the direct channel improves, and what it does not

It improves integrity. A SHA-256 published next to the file protects against copy errors and the transport, not against a compromised origin: whoever controls the server changes the file and the hash. With a signature, compromising the server is no longer enough — the private key does not live there. And the signature is hybrid on purpose: someone who stores a delivery today and has a quantum computer tomorrow still cannot forge it retroactively. Signing a library sold on post-quantum grounds with RSA would be a contradiction in writing.

It does not improve the confidentiality of what was already published, and we are not going to imply otherwise. The artifacts that were on crates.io and PyPI remain downloadable with their full source: crates.io never allows deletion, and npm's unpublish window expires. Quipu's cryptography is permanently public — which is how it should be anyway, since a cipher whose security depends on nobody seeing the algorithm is not secure. What is at stake here is what you install, not whether the design is known.

The code, on request — and its model

quipu is AGPL-3.0: free if you publish your derivative. To use it without publishing there is a commercial license (on quote); and if you need bespoke development on top of it, it is quoted by scope. Ask at contacto@xiliux.com.

The full source —vendored to build offline, with its hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-87 signature and its static verifier— is delivered on request to anyone auditing it, not by public download.

The key fingerprint, published here and not in the package

A signature is only worth something if the public key it is checked against arrives by a path the attacker does not control. If the key travels inside the same delivery as the file it authenticates, whoever can substitute the file substitutes the key too and verification passes anyway: that is a circle, and a circle proves nothing.

So the fingerprint is published here, on a channel separate from the delivery. Check that the key you received has this fingerprint before you verify anything with it:

SHA-256 of the Xiliux artifact-signing public key

  f64e 46b9 676f e72e 4f79 a9d1 3664 ebfe
  94f9 6119 eb26 b037 8631 16dd f3d2 7d7d

  tr -d '
' < CLAVE-PUBLICA.txt | sha256sum

If they do not match, do not verify: contact us by another route and say so.

What did not change

The licence is still AGPL-3.0, and it will not change.
It is still free. The commercial licence exempts from network copyleft those who cannot publish their own code; it does not buy access, which belongs to everyone.
It goes to anyone who asks, not to an approved list.

If you are an auditor

Ask the same way, say so in the email, and we add whatever you need: the traceability between the released version and its commit, the history, and a session walking through whichever part of the code interests you. An independent audit is what this project most needs right now; we are not going to make it difficult.

Back to Quipu →